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The Politics of Meaning:
Law Dictionaries and the Liberal
Tradition of Interpretation
by GARY L. McDOWELL*
INTRODUCTION
At least since John Cowell's Interpreter was adjudged by the
Committee on Grievances of the House of Commons in 1610 to be "very
unadvised, and undiscreet, tending to the disreputation of the honour and
power of the common laws" have law dictionaries been objects of occa-
sional controversy.' Yet legal dictionaries, as well as dictionaries more
generally, have remained a constant resource in American law for those
seeking to give meaning to the words of both statutes and constitutional
provisions. They have appeared in the pages of the reports since the
beginning of the republic; 2 a majority of the justices of the Supreme
Court, at one time or another, have turned to them; 3 they have not been
simply the refuge of the lesser sorts who have ascended the highest bench,
but have been relied upon by those justices generally held in greatest
esteem; 4 and their use has never been the preserve of any particular
*Professor of American Studies and Director of the Institute of United States Studies,
University of London.
"I am grateful to W. Hamilton Bryson, Curtis Gannon, Mary Ann Glendon, A.E. Dick
Howard, Sanford Levinson, James McClellan, Johnathan O'Neill, Stephen Presser,
Christopher Ricks, and Ralph Rossum for their helpful criticism and suggestions. I owe a
special note of thanks to the late Raoul Berger for his constant encouragement of this pro-
ject. The scholarly world is a lesser place without him. The opportunity to present a version
of this essay at the "Language and Law" conference at the University of Texas Law School
was especially helpful, and I am indebted to Roy Mersky for the chance to have taken part in
that superb gathering of legal lexicographers."
1. As quoted in S.B. Chrimes, "The Constitutional Ideas of Dr. John Cowell," English
Historical Review 64(1949): 461-87, p. 467.
2. The first reference to a dictionary appears in a case before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, Respublica v. Steele, 2 U.S. 92 (1785).
3. For a survey of the uses of dictionaries, see Samuel A. Thumma and Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, "The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use
of Dictionaries," Buffalo Law Review 47(1999): 227-296. See especially the three appen-
dices to the article at pp. 303, 397, and 471. Thumma and Kirchmeier point out that as of the
1997-98 term, "sixty-four justices have cited to the dictionary at least once." Among those
who did not rely on dictionaries for meaning were Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo,
p. 256.
4. Justice Joseph Story, for example, turned to Cowell's Interpreter in United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163 n.8. For one of the most extensive surveys of dictionaries, seeking
to establish that "sacrilege" and "blasphemy" are two very distinct matters, see Justice Felix
Frankfurter's concurring opinion and appendix of dictionary meanings in Burstyn v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 506-33, and 533-40.
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methodology or jurisprudential view. 5
There have always been nagging doubts about the legitimacy of
resorting to dictionaries to find legal meaning, the most frequently cited
being Judge-Learned Hand's admonition that judges ought "not to make a
fortress out of a dictionary." 6 Over the past fifteen years or so, however,
what had been merely scattered concerns have coalesced into a focused
argument against the dangers of dictionaries as tools of interpretation. 7
Dictionaries, it is argued, suffer from a "fundamental indeterminacy" that
can "mask fundamental arbitrariness with the appearance of rationality." 8
Another critic sees dictionaries as simply creating an endlessly circular
exercise: "Lexicographers define words with words. Words in the defini-
tion are defined by more words, as are those words." As a result, relying
on a dictionary "simply pushes the problem back."9 Perhaps most damn-
ing is the claim that a judge can scan "dictionaries until he finds the defin-
ition that suits his purposes," thereby undermining the greatest claim for
using dictionaries in the first place - their alleged "objectivity." t0
The catalyst of this criticism has been Justice Antonin Scalia and his
intellectually powerful resurrection of textualism in statutory interpreta-
tion. II As he has denied the legitimacy of relying on legislative history as
5. See the general survey provided by Thumma and Kirchmeier in their three appendices,
"The Lexicon has Become a Fortress."
6. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d. 737, 739 (2d. Cir., 1945).
7. See, for example, David Mellinkoff, "The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary,"
UCLA Law Review 31(1983): 423-42; Aaron J. Rynd, "Dictionaries and the Interpretation of
Words: A Summary of Difficulties," Alberta Law Review 29(1991): 712-20; Lawrence
Solan, "When Judges Use Dictionaries," American Speech 68(1993): 50-57; A. Raymond
Randolph, "Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation," Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy 17(1994): 71-78; "Note: Looking it Up: Dictionaries and
Statutory Interpretation," Harvard Law Review 107(1994): 1437-54; and Ellen P. Aprill,
"The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court," Arizona State Law
Journal 30(1998): 275-336.
See also, D. S. Bland, "Some Notes on the Evolution of the Legal Dictionary," Journal of
Legal History ](1980): 75-84.
8. "Looking it Up," pp. 1445, 1446.
9. Randolph, "Dictionaries," p. 72.
10. Aprill, "Law of the Word," p. 330.
II. Justice Scalia's most fully developed argument is to be found in "Common-Law
Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws," in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 3-47. See also "The Rule of Law as a Law
of Rules," University of Chicago Law Review 56(1989): 1175-88; and "Originalism: The
Lesser Evil," University of Cincinnati Law Review 57(1989): 849-65.
The literature surrounding the new textualism, especially of its rejection of the traditional
reliance on legislative history in statutory interpretation, is sprawling. For a sampling of the
various arguments see Kenneth W. Starr "Observations about the use of Legislative
History," Duke Law Journal (1987): 371-79; William N. Eskridge, Jr., "The New
Textualism," UCLA Law Review 37(1990): 621- 91; Stephen Breyer, "On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes," Southern California Law Review 65(1992):
845-74; "Note: Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today,"
Harvard Law Review 105(1992): 1005-24; Clark N. Cunningham, Judith N. Levi, Georgia
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a guide to statutory meaning, he has turned frequently to dictionaries as
one means of establishing the intention of the legislature through the
words by which it chose to express that intention. By one count, since his
elevation to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1985, Justice
Scalia has "relied on the dictionary more times than any other Justice in
the history of the Court."12
At the same time that the new textualists have been turning to dictio-
naries to establish statutory meaning, so has there also been a growing
reliance on dictionaries to help establish the original meaning of provi-
sions of the Constitution. As Justice Scalia has led the way for statutory
textualists, Justice Clarence Thomas recently has taken the lead for consti-
tutional originalists. In his concurrence in United States v. Lopez, 13
Justice Thomas sought to undermine Justice Stevens's dissenting claim
that the majority's holding that the Commerce Clause did not extend to
the prohibition of firearms near school houses was "radical"14 by recourse
to dictionaries extant at the time of the American founding.15 His purpose
in recovering the meaning of "commerce" as that would have been under-
stood to the founders was to demonstrate just how far "our case law has
drifted ... from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause."16
In one of the most politically interesting but seemingly least consti-
tutionally controversial cases of recent terms, Justice Thomas wrote
another concurring opinion in order to stake out yet another area of con-
stitutional law in which he intends to push for a return to the original
understanding.17 While he was willing to join the opinion that held that
the act-of-production doctrine (where the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination can only be invoked to bar papers or other
physical evidence ordered to be produced by a subpoena duces tecum
M. Green, and Jeffrey P. Kaplan, "Plain Meaning and Hard Cases," rev. of Lawrence M.
Solan, The Language of Judges, Yale Law Journal 103(1994): 1561-1625; Thomas W.
Merrill,"Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine," Washington University Law
Quarterly 72(1994): 351-75; Frank H. Easterbrook, "Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation," Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 17(1994): 61-70;
Roger Colinvaux, "What is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good Judging Under a
Textualist Lens," Indiana Law Journal 72(1997): 1133-63; Lawrence M. Solan, "Learning
Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases," Wisconsin Law Review
1997(1997): 235-83; Jane S. Schacter, "The Confounding Common Law Originalism in
Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History
Debate and Beyond," Stanford Law Review 51(1998): 1-57.
12. Thumma and Kirchmeier, "The Lexicon has Become a Fortress," p. 256.
13. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
14. Ibid., pp. 585-86.
15. The dictionaries Justice Thomas drew to support his argument were Samuel Johnson,
A Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.; London: W. Strahan, 1773); N. Bailey, An
Universal Etymological English Dictionary (26th ed.; Edinburgh: Charles Elliot, 1789); and
T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed.; Philadelphia: W.
Young, Mills & Son, 1796). Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. United States v. Webster L. Hubbell, 120 5. Ct. 2037 (2000).
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where the act of producing such evidence would contain "testimonial"
features) was properly applied in the instant case on the basis of existing
case lawl 8 (which invalidated indictments against Webster Hubbell that
had been brought by the Office of Independent Counsel in its Whitewater
investigation), he wrote to express his willingness to reconsider the matter
in a future case. In the case of the Fifth Amendment in Hubbell, as in the
case of the Commerce Clause in Lopez, Justice Thomas believes that pre-
vailing case law may be "inconsistent with the original meaning" of the
Constitution.19
Once again, what is of greatest interest in Justice Thomas's concur-
rence in Hubbell, beyond the substantive questions of the law, is his
reliance on dictionaries "published around the time of the founding" 20 to
determine what the original understanding of the Constitution might be. In
showing that "witness" originally meant more than merely someone who
might give testimony, he looked among other sources to such law dictio-
naries as Giles Jacob's A New Law Dictionary (two separate editions) and
Timothy Cunningham's New and Complete Law Dictionary.2 1 As his
opinions in both Lopez and Hubbell make clear, Justice Thomas believes
that the original meaning of the Constitution can be found with the aid of
those law dictionaries with which the American founding generation itself
would have been familiar. And there is much historical evidence to
believe that he is right in that assumption.
What has been missing in the debates over the role of dictionaries in
judicial interpretation has been any consideration of how they arose, what
might have been the underlying assumptions of the legal lexicographers
who saw fit to produce them, and what place such dictionaries might have
in the broader literature of political and constitutional thought. When
those foundational elements are examined, it is clear that there was more
going on in the creation and evolution of law dictionaries than merely
providing convenient word lists for practising lawyers or horn books for
struggling students.22 They were, from the beginning, part of the legal
profession's contribution to the language of the modern liberal tradition
and were meant for laymen as well as lawyers.23
The relationship of law dictionaries to the broader tradition of con-
stitutional and legal liberalism is seen most clearly in the life and work of
Giles Jacob. Although- he is dismissed by some today as merely a writer
18. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
19. 120 5. Ct. 2037, 2050.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., at 2051.
22. For a view of eighteenth-century legal education and the books used, including law
dictionaries, see David Lemmings, "Blackstone and Law Reform by Education: Preparation
for the Bar and Lawyerly Culture in Eighteenth-Century England," Law and History Review
16(1998): 211-55, pp. 240-45.
23. On the American side, see Eldon Revare James, "A List of Legal Treatises Printed in
the British Colonies and the American States Before 1801," in Harvard Legal Essays, ed.
Roscoe Pound (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 159-211.
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of "undistinguished works," 24 Jacob was in fact one of the most prolific
and widely known compilers of legal texts in his day.2 5 In addition to his
New Law Dictionary, Jacob published no fewer than 33 legal texts, many
of them running to several editions. His treatises, along with the dictio-
nary, were to be found in many early American libraries, including those
of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.2 6 In particular, Jacob's dictionary
was in twice as many law libraries as the second most popular legal lexi-
con, Cowell's Interpreter, and in colonial Virginia, it was the fourth most
popular of all law books available.2 7 It was simply "the most widely used
English law dictionary" in the early republic.2 8
Little is known of Giles Jacob beyond the few biographical strands he
chose to weave into his various works. 29 From his non-legal works it is clear
that he aspired to a literary life, fancying himself both a poet and a play-
wright; he was thus outraged when he found himself the target of Alexander
Pope's scorn in the Dunciad (1729) as nothing more than a "blunderbuss of
law." 30 But it was the law and not literature that ultimately earned him his
living and reputation. Indeed, he claimed he had been "bred to the law", and
24. A.W.B. Simpson, ed., Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law (London:
Butterworths, 1984), p. 272.
25. "Few men have left behind them more ample testimonies of their industry than Mr.
Giles Jacob; his publications have been very numerous." His New Law Dictionary in partic-
ular was deemed a "very valuable work." Richard Whalley Bridgman, A Short View of Legal
Bibliography (London: W. Reed, 1807), pp. 165, 169.
Jacob's prodigious outpouring was undoubtedly as much a matter of sales as scholarship
and, as a result, many of his works do have the marks of haste. See Holdsworth, History of
English Law, XII: 340. For a glimpse of Jacob's successes, see the account book for one of
his publishers, Bernard Lintot, in John Nichols, Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth-
Century, 9 vols. (London: Nichols and Son, 1814), VIII: 296-97.
26. See William Hamilton Bryson, Census of Law Books in Colonial Virginia
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978); Nicholas Sellers, "The Smith Nicholas
Law Library," Law Library Journal 83(1991): 463-69, Herbert A. Johnson, Imported
Eighteenth-Century Law Treatises in American Libraries (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1978); E. Millicent Sowerby, Catalogue of the Library of Thomas
Jefferson, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1952); and Lindsay Swift, ed.,
Catalogue of the John Adams Library in the Public Library of the City of Boston (Boston:
The Trustees of the Boston Public Library, 1917).
27. Johnson, Eighteenth-Century Law Treatises, supra note 25, p. 61; Bryson, Census of
Law Books, p. xvii.
28. Leonard Levy, "Origins of the Fifth Amendment and its Critics," Cardozo Law
Review 19(1997): 821-60, p. 854.
29. He was bom in 1686 in Romsey, one of eight children of Henry and his wife Susanna,
from the Thornburgh family of Wiltshire. His father was a maltster who died in 1734 leaving
Jacob a modest inheritance. In 1733 Jacob married Jane Dexter in the parish church of St.
Andrew in Holbom.
30. Pope summed him up this way:
Jacob, the Scourge of Grammar, mark with awe,
Nor less revere him, Blunderbuss of Law.
See J. McLaverty, "Pope and Giles Jacob's Lives of the Poets: The Dunciad as Alternative
Literary History," Modern Philology 83(1985-86): 22-32.
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at the age of 25 embarked on his career as a legal scrivener.3 1
By 1720 when Jacob began work on what would become an "entire-
ly new departure in legal literature" when his New Law Dictionary finally
appeared in 1729, he had already published 16 of his legal tracts and 10
volumes of plays, poetry and other non-legal works. 32 But the originality
of Jacob's own work and the political implications of his motives must be
viewed in light of the evolution of law dictionaries down to his time. For
over the course of the two hundred years that separated Jacob's dictionary
from the first such volume to be published in the early sixteenth-century,
the political and philosophical worlds had undergone tumultuous changes.
It is within that context of Enlightenment liberalism and its concern with
language that the rise of law dictionaries is best understood.
THE RISE OF LAW DICTIONARIES
The first law dictionary to be published, Rastell's Exposiciones
Terminorum Legum Anglorum (1527), which came to be known simply as
the Termes de la Ley, ran to seven editions by 1667.33 Although Rastell's
work had been preceded by something akin to dictionaries, the glossaries or
vocabularies of Anglo-Saxon words, his law dictionary was distinguished
by aspiring to be more. 34 It contained definitions of words and placed them
in alphabetical order. But the most interesting thing about this early effort to
define with some degree of precision the meaning of legal language is the
extent to which Rastell anticipates the more theoretically sophisticated
arguments that will eventually come from the founders of modern constitu-
tional liberalism, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Rastell's purpose in cre-
ating his law dictionary was, at the deepest level, political.
While men are bound in their conduct by "the order & law of
Nature," Rastell wrote, that law is not sufficient to the ultimate goal of
civil peace. The fact is that "there is no multitude of people in no realm
that can continue in unity and peace without they be thereto compelled by
some good law & order." In Rastell's view, it is "a good reasonable com-
mon law" that ultimately will make "a good common peace." The empha-
sis on the commonality of law is essential in Rastell's view, given the
nature of mankind. As he points out, "as every man is variant from the
other in visage, so they be variable in mind and condition, therefore one
law & one governor for one realm and for one people is most necessary."
31. Giles Jacob, The Poetical Register, 2 vols. (London: Bettesworth, 1723), 1: 318; The
Modern Justice (London: B. Lintot, 1720), p.iii. So, too, does he claim to have been the
keeper of "very considerable estates for seven years together successively." The Compleat
Sportsman (London: E. Nutt and R. Gosling, 1718), preface. See also The Country
Gentleman's Vade Mecum (London: William Taylor, 1717).
32. John D. Cowley, A Bibliography of Abridgments, Digests, Dictionaries and Indexes
of English Law to the Year 1800 (London: Selden Society, 1932), p.xc.
33. William S. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 17 vols. (London: Metheun, 1903-
1966), V: 401.
34. Cowley, Abridgments, pp. lxxix-lxxxi.
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The alternative, "diverse rulers & governors & diverse orders or laws one
contrary to another," will only lead to conflict and division within society.
One governor under one law will be able to "bringeth diverse & much
people to one good unity."35
The essence of public order is law; it is both necessary "& a virtuous and
good thing." It keeps people from committing wrongs "willingly" and guides
them from doing so by negligence. In short, the law has an educating role to
play. If the law is to fulfill its important social role, and be both "virtuous &
good," it is essential that "every man ... have the knowledge of the law." 36
Rastell makes one of the. earliest cases for the necessity of written law:
[l]t is necessary for every realm to have a law reasonable & sufficient to govern
the great multitude of the people, ergo it is necessary that the great multitude of
people have the knowledge of that same law, to which they be bound, ergo it fol-
loweth that the law in every realm should be so published, declared, & written, in
such wise that the people so bound to the same, might soon and shortly come to
the knowledge thereof or else such a law, so kept secretly in the knowledge of a
few persons & from the knowledge of the great multitude, may rather be called a
trap and a net to bring the people to vexation and trouble than a good order to
bring them to peace & quietness. 37
Rastell understood that if the law is indeed to be successful in its
purpose, that is, as having been "ordained and devised for the augmenta-
tion of justice," then it is essential that those who are to be bound and
governed by it must know what it says. One cannot be bound by the law,
one cannot be restrained and guided by it, unless one knows what it com-
mands and prohibits. Thus did he see his task in the dictionary as educat-
ing those who might otherwise be "ignorant of the law" by undertaking to
"declare & to expound certain obscure and dark termes concerning the
laws of this realm." For Rastell, it is only by knowledge of the law that
"the true execution of the same law" is to be enjoyed, and thereby the
preservation and increase of the fortunes of the commonwealth. 38
The next major development in law dictionaries came in 1607 with
the publication of Cowell's Interpreter, a work by a distinguished profes-
sor of the civil law that caused outrage among the common lawyers of his
day, including the powerful Sir Edward Coke who thought Cowell to be
"a profest enemy to the Westminster courts." 39 Cowell's particular sin
35. John Rastell, Exposicions of the Termes of the Lawes of England (London, 1567),
"Prologue," pp. Ai; Aii; Ai.
36. Ibid., p. Aii.
37. Ibid., p. Aiii.
38. Ibid., pp. Aiii, Aiv.
39. As quoted in the preface to the 1708 edition of the dictionary, A Law Dictionary: or,
The Interpreter, White Kennet, ed. (London: D. Browne, 1708), p. iv.
Cowell was a man of substance and accomplishment. In 1594 he had been named Regius
Professor the Civil Law at Cambridge University. In 1598 he had become master of Trinity
Hall, Cambridge, and from 1603-4 had served as Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge. From 1608
he served as vicar general to the Archbishop of Canterbury. For an account of Cowell's life
generally as well as the controversy over the Interpreter in particular, see Chrimes, "The
Constitutional Ideas of Dr. John Cowell."
2000
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
was to attack Thomas Littleton, Coke's much admired oracle of the com-
mon law, but his most serious political error came in his definition of the
King's prerogative.
Prerogative of the King (Praerogitiva regis): is that especiall power, preemi-
nence, or privilege that the king hath in any kind, over and above other persons,
and above the ordinary course of the common law, in the right of his crowne.
And this worde (Praerogativa) is used by the civilians in the same sense.
The reaction to Cowell's book no doubt caught the "meek and well
intentioned professor" whose motives were most assuredly "purely acade-
mic" by surprise. He seems even to have been detained in custody for a
period during the height of the controversy.40 But to an age as increasing-
ly leery of such talk of prerogative power as that in which he lived and
wrote, it was unlikely that Cowell's pledge to contribute to the "advance-
ment of knowledge" by resort to the civilian tradition as against that of
England's own common law would find much favour. His insistence that
even the statute of the king's prerogative "an.17, Ed.2, containeth not the
summe of the king's whole prerogative" but rather his "prerogative rea-
cheth much farther" was unlikely to warm the hearts of those in
Parliament. When it came to his general catalogue of powers, Cowell
argued, "there is not one that belonged to the most absolute prince in the
world, which doth not also belong to our king." He was confident: "I hold
it incontroulable, that the king of England is an absolute king." It was for
such views that the Committee of Grievances concluded that Cowell's
lexicon was indeed "very unadvised, and undiscreet, tending to the disrep-
utation of the honour and power of the common laws." 4 1
Coke-through his connections with both the King and the House of
Commons-a later editor of the Interpreter explained, was able to repre-
sent "Dr. Cowell as an enemy of both."42 But it was not just Coke that
constituted Cowell's problem. He had in fact innocently stumbled into the
crossfire between King and Commons over issues seemingly far removed
from his law dictionary. Both sides of the debates then raging over rev-
enue policies and efforts to reform feudal tenures found Cowell's
Interpreter a useful tool. In the end, Francis Bacon urged James I to join
with Lords and Commons in a joint attack on Cowell, rather than allow
the Commons alone to attack Cowell on the idea of prerogative and there-
by, the monarchy. In a masterful political manoeuvre, James "terminated
the episode by an astute exercise of the prerogative power." 43 The book
was banned by royal proclamation.
On 25 March 1610, James I issued his proclamation against the
Interpreter, condemning Cowell who was "only a civilian by profession"
and thus guilty of "meddling in matters above his reach." 44 Cowell's
40. Chrimes, "The Constitutional Ideas of Dr. John Cowell," pp. 464, 467, 474.
41 . As quoted in Chimes, "The Constitutional Ideas of Dr. John Cowell, p.467.
42. Kennet, ed., Interpreter, p.iv.
43. Chrimes, "The Constitutional Ideas of Dr. John Cowell," p.473.
44. The proclamation is reprinted in Kennet, ed., Interpreter, pp. v-vii.
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arguments were too clever, seeming to support the king' s prerogative
power while truly putting forward views that were "in some points very
derogatory to the supreme power of this crown." It was, the King pointed
out, "utterly unlawful to any subject to speak or write against that law
under which he liveth, and which we are sworn and are resolved to main-
tain." 45 The conclusion was foregone:
[W]e do hereby not only prohibit the buying, uttering or reading of the said book,
but do also will and straitly command all and singular persons whatsoever, who
have or shall have any of them in their hands or custody, that upon pain of our
high displeasure, and the consequence thereof, they do deliver the same presently
upon this publication to the Lord Mayor of London... or otherwise to the sheriff
of the county where they or any of them shall reside, and in the two universities
to the Chancellour or vice-chancellour there, to the intent that further order may
be given for the utter suppressing thereof.46
One of the more important facts about Cowell's Interpreter is that he
had exposed a "medieval constitutional ambiguity" that would have to be
resolved. 47 His defense of the royal prerogative drew attention to the fact
that in the notion of prerogative "was an element ... not amenable to the
ordinary rules of law." Cowell's logic was simple: "it was the manifest
duty of the king to govern, and to that end he was vested with a discre-
tionary power, the exercise of which could not be subject to legal rules or
restrictions." 48 Implicit in Cowell's "honest but impolitic zeal for defini-
tion" lay one way of resolving the tension present in the royal prerogative
between the desire for the rule of law and the necessity of the rule of
men.49 For as Salisbury argued during the debates over the Interpreter, "it
was dangerous to submit the power of a king to definition." 50 But as S. B.
Chrimes has put it, Cowell's "interpretation was not to be suppressed so
easily as his Interpreter."5 1 What would later emerge from notions such
as those implicit in Cowell's work was the idea of constitutionalism in the
modern sense.
When the times changed and the Interpreter was once again pub-
lished twenty-seven years later, the offending passages were still pre-
sent.52 It retained an important place in the history of English law, run-
ning to seven editions by 1727.53 One of its later editors was Thomas
Manley, who followed Cowell in the belief that any truly learned man of
45. Ibid., p. vi.
46. Ibid. See also the speech of James I to "the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at
White-Hall" of March 21, 1609, in Charles H. Mcllwain, ed., The Political Works of James I
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), pp. 306- 325; the controversy surrounding the
Interpreter and his "censure" of Cowell is discussed on p. 307.
47. Chrimes, "The Constitutional Ideas of Dr. John Cowell," p.483.
48. Ibid., p.482.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p.471.
51. Ibid., p.483.
52. Ibid., p.474.
53. Holdsworth, History of English Law, V:22.
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the law simply had to know those "intermixtures of the civil law" that had
originally been Cowell's plan. 54
Around the same time Manley was updating Cowell in his
Nomosethetes (1672), Thomas Blount undertook to produce a new law
dictionary, which he entitled Nomolexicon (1670).55 Blount's intention
was to turn legal dictionaries back to the common law and away from the
misguided reliance on the civil law tradition that Cowell had begun and
Manley was seeking to perpetuate. But Blount saw his new law dictionary
as more than merely the definition of terms; he thought it useful as "a
repertory, or common-place; since many statutes, law-books, charters and
records are cited, or referr'd to in most words." 56 In this way, Blount pro-
duced a scholarly work "devoted far more to etymology and the descrip-
tion of ancient customs than to the explanation of common law terms." 57
The works of Rastell, Cowell, Manley and Blount would be sur-
passed in the first half of the eighteenth century by Jacob and his New
Law Dictionary. But to understand his new effort, attention must first be
paid both to his other legal works (for, as he said, all his other works had
been in the nature of "trial trips, and gave him the experience he needed to
produce his dictionary" 58) and to the political and theoretical context
within which he understood himself to be working. For Jacob's age was
one more concerned with securing the rights and liberties of the people
than with bolstering claims of the King's prerogatives.
A decade before he published his dictionary, Jacob compiled a trea-
tise on the common laws the purpose of which was to enable the people
not only "to judge of the powers and prerogatives of the governors to
whom our obedience is due; but also, of the rights and liberties of the peo-
ple." 59 What stood between Cowell and the King's prerogative and Jacob
and the rights of the people, of course, was the new philosophy of Hobbes
and Locke. The politics of meaning that lay at the heart of the legal lexi-
cographers' craft had come to be informed by the political thought of
modern liberalism.
LIBERALISM, LANGUAGE AND LEXICONS
The epistemological revolution wrought in the science of politics by
Hobbes and Locke, a revolution that became the foundation of modem
constitutionalism, took as its point of departure the belief that civil society
rests only upon the voluntary consent of free and independent individuals.
At the center of this understanding of consent lay an appreciation for the
54. Thomas Manley, Nomosethetes: The Interpreter (London: J. Streater, 1672), pp.i-ii.
55. (London: John Martin and Henry Herringman, 1670).
56. Holdsworth, History of English Law, XII: 175-76.
57. Cowley, Abridgments, p.lxxxix.
58. Holdsworth, History of English Law, XII: 162.
59. Giles Jacob, Lex Constitutionis: or; the Gentleman's Law (London: E. Nutt and B.
Gosling, 1719), p.vi.
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necessity of language.60 For both Hobbes and Locke it was by language
that society was formed and sustained. As Hobbes said, without language
there could be "neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor
peace, no more than amongst lyons, bears, and wolves." 6 1
Locke repeatedly made essentially the same argument as to the
necessity of language. In both the Second Treatise of Government and the
Essay Concerning Human Understanding he argued that God fitted men"with understanding and language to continue and enjoy" living in
society. 62 The importance of language was as clear to Locke as to
Hobbes; it was nothing less than "the great instrument, and common tye
of society." 63
Both Hobbes and Locke looked upon language as purely convention-
al, there being no natural connection between particular sounds and ideas;
names were arbitrarily imposed by men for their convenience. 64 The fact
that each man by nature could come up with particular and distinctive
words or names for certain ideas was, in itself, an insufficient basis for
society. In order to engage in their affairs, both public and private, men
would eventually have to reach some agreement as to the meaning of cer-
tain sounds or words. Such common use, "by a tacit consent, appropriates
certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages." 65 And, generally speak-
ing, the routine affairs of men are carried out with an easy and unofficial
kind of agreement; as Locke so bluntly put it, "vulgar notions suit vulgar
discourses." 66 But event he vulgar soon learn that such shared meaning
for common use is essential: "He that applies names to ideas, different
from their common use, wants propriety in his language, and speaks gib-
berish." 67 A general agreement as to meaning is necessary for what Locke
called the "civil use" of language, "such a communication of thoughts and
ideas by words as serve for the upholding common conversation and com-
merce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life, in the
societies of men, one amongst another."68
60. For a more complete discussion of these matters see Gary L. McDowell, "The
Language of Law and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism," William and Mary
Quarterly (3d Ser.) 55(1998): 375-98.
61. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed.W.G.P.Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1909), p.2 4 .
62. Peter Laslett, ed., Locke's Two Treatises of Government (2nd. ed.; Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 336:77.
63. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1975), 111.1. 1, p.4 0 2 .
64. See Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore in William Molesworth, ed., The English Works of
Thomas Hobbes (II vols.; London: J. Bohn, 1839-1845), 1:56; and Locke, Essay, 111.11.8,
p.4 08.
65. Locke, Essay, 111.11.8, p.4 0 8 .
66. Ibid., III.XI.10, p.514.
67. Ibid., III.X.31, p.506.
68. Ibid., Il.IX.3, p.476. This civil use of language is less in need of precision than the
philosophical use of words in Locke's view.
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Following Hobbes, Locke understood that all truth and falsehood in
human affairs was a matter of language; it was a matter of the agreement
or disagreement of ideas as expressed in words. Thus was it essential that
there be some degree of precision in all language by which men intend to
make themselves known. Hobbes put it memorably:
Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations,
a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses
stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in
words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed.69
This concern led Hobbes to argue for the necessity of clear and accu-
rate definitions if men were to find their way in society, moving from
primitive to more polished times through the acquisition and dissemina-
tion of knowledge amongst themselves. The "first use of speech" he
argued, was the acquisition of science which in turn depends upon "the
right definition of names." Failure to get it right in the beginning of any
discourse will have disastrous consequences, for "the errours of defini-
tions multiply themselves as the reckoning proceeds." Thus is it essential
that all understand that "words ... have their signification by agreement
and constitution of men." The reason there must be some agreement is
that the entire point of speech or language is to spawn in the reader or lis-
tener the same idea the writer or speaker intended to convey; that is what
human understanding is all about, in Hobbes's opinion. 70
Locke shared Hobbes's view of the importance of reaching a general
agreement as to precise definitions of words. It is a matter of learning and
retaining what meanings have been agreed.7 l This is especially critical
when it comes to complex ideas and moral words, such as "justice". A
definition, Locke argued, "is the only way, whereby the precise meaning
of moral words can be known; and yet a way, whereby their meaning may
be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any contest about
it."72 It was precisely the fact that complex ideas and moral words are the
contrivances of men that allowed Locke to suggest that morality is as
capable of demonstration as pure mathematics. 73
This idea is what led Locke to suggest in the Essay Concerning
Human Understanding that human discourse and society would be greatly
aided by the advent of a dictionary, an authoritative listing of definitions
68. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.28.
70. Ibid., pp. 28-31, 283.
71. "Words having naturally no signification, the idea which each stands for, must be
learned and retained by those, who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse.
with others in any language." Locke, Essay, IIl.IX.5, p.477.
72. Ibid., Ill.IX.17, p.517. As Hobbes had put it earlier, "the light of human minds is per-
spicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged, from ambiguity; reason is
the pace; encrease of science the way; and the benefit of mankind the end." Leviathan, p.37.
73. "Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that morality is capable of demonstra-
tion, as well as mathematicks: Since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand
for, may be perfectly known; and so the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves, be
certainly discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge." Locke, Essay, III.XI.16, p.516.
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derived from the "sensible qualities" of things observable upon which
men could depend.74 Although Locke thought that such a truly philosoph-
ical dictionary as the sort he proposed, what he called a "natural history,"
would require "too many hands, as well as too much time, cost, pains, and
sagacity, ever to be hoped for," he had no doubt there could be a compila-
tion of a lesser sort, with definitions provided in "the sense men use them
in." 75 Such a compilation would be the foundation of social and political
intercourse, and would enhance both civil and philosophical exchanges
amongst men. In time Locke's suggestion would come to fruition. The
Essay Concerning Human Understanding eventually inspired Samuel
Johnson to produce a dictionary of the English language, the principles of
which conformed to Locke's own theory of knowledge and language.76
By the time Johnson began work in 1746 on what would become his
masterpiece, "Locke's ideas on language and the mind had become com-
monplaces." 77 But Johnson did not just share Locke's epistemological
assumptions that "words are but the signs of ideas."78 He also employed
Locke in some 3,241 quotations in his Dictionary.79 By incorporating
works such as Locke's Essay along with numerous poems, histories and
other works by such esteemed authors as Addison, Donne, Dryden and
Shakespeare, Johnson contributed greatly to the "encyclopaedic tradition of
lexicography." 80 By adopting a version of a commonplace book of impor-
tant quotations as the model for his dictionary, Johnson sought to go
beyond mere linguistic analysis or etymology; rather, he created the
Dictionary for educational and moral purposes. 81 This he achieved by "pre-
senting quotations that, besides illustrating the meanings of words, teach
fundamental points of morality." 82 The encyclopaedic approach of the
Dictionary of the English Language would, from the time of its publication
in 1755, dominate dictionary makers, including Noah Webster in the United
States upon whom Johnson's influence was indeed "considerable." 83
74. Ibid., Ill. XI. 25, p.522.
75. Ibid.
76. See Allen Reddick, The Making of Johnson's Dictionary, 1746-1773 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
77. Elizabeth Hedrick, "Locke's Theory of Language and Johnson's Dictionary,"
Eighteenth Century Studies 20(1986-87): 422, p. 422.
78. Samuel Johnson, The Works of Samuel Johnson, ed. Robert Lynam (12 vols.;
London: W. Baynes, 1825) V: 28.
79. James McLaverty, "From Definition to Explanation: Locke's Influence on Johnson's
Dictionary," Journal of the History of Ideas 47(1986): 377-394, p. 384.
80. Robert De Maria, Jr., Johnson's Dictionary and the Language of Learning (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986), p.7 .
81. Ibid., p.13.
82. Ibid., p.19. But "just as he sought quotations from certain writers because of their politi-
cal, moral, or religious beliefs, he rejected others, whatever the passage, because he feared that
he would suggest approval of their ideas." Reddick, The Making of Johnson's Dictionary, p.34.
83. Ronald A. Wells, Dictionaries and the Authoritarian Tradition (The Hague: Mouton,
1973), p.25. See also Olivia Smith, The Politics of Language, 1791-1819 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984).
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But Johnson was not the first to follow Locke's lead. A quarter cen-
tury before Johnson published his monumental work, Jacob published his
new kind of law dictionary, one that sought to provide for the legal pro-
fession the kind of "natural history" Locke had suggested such dictionar-
ies should be.84 Both Johnson and Jacob were part of a tradition of lexi-
cography that stretched back at least to 1604 in the case of dictionaries of
the English language, and to 1527 in the case of law dictionaries. 85 Such
was the tradition that one might safely argue that "the whole history of
English lexicography makes one slow to accept a claim of striking origi-
nality for any dictionary maker."86 Yet Jacob, no less than Johnson, did
indeed produce a work of striking originality. For his objective was noth-
ing less than to produce "a kind of a library" 87 for a new, and largely
Lockean, legal age.
THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF JACOB'S LEGAL
LEXICOGRAPHY
Jacob's intellectual world was dominated by Locke, and Jacob's
own career hovered around the edges of Locke's world. William
Blathwayt, for whom Jacob worked for example, served with Locke as a
Commissioner of Trade and was a rival during Locke's control of the
Board of Trade (1696-1700).88 Upon his retirement, Locke was succeeded
by Matthew Prior, an acquaintance and occasional correspondent of
Jacob. Jacob also dedicated one of his legal tracts to Peter King, Locke's
nephew and close friend during his last years. 89 At a minimum, Jacob
moved in a world where Locke's ideas were commonplace, and it is the
influence of Locke on the ideas expressed in Jacob's various essays that
provides the political context for the dictionary maker's legal thinking and
his desire to render the law accessible through his new method of
organisation. The point was to enable the people to defend their rights and
liberties.
The most clearly Lockean work Jacob produced is a small work
84. Locke, Essay, III.XI.25, p.522.
85. See De Witt T. Starnes and Gertrude E. Noyes, The English Dictionary from Cawdrey
to Johnson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946). See also James A. H.
Murray, The Evolution of English Lexicography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900); Mary
Segar, "Dictionary Making in the Early Eighteenth Century," R.E.S. 7(1931): 210-213;
M.M. Mathews, A Survey of English Dictionaries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933).
86. James H. Sledd and Gwin J. Kolb, Dr. Johnson's Dictionary: Essays in the
Biography of a Book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p.4.
87. Giles Jacob, A New Law Dictionary (London: E. & R. Nutt and R. Gosling, 1729),
Preface, p.ii.
88. See Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (London: Blackwells, 1957),
pp.399-4 4 8; and G. A. Jacobsen, William Blathwayt: A Late Seventeenth Century
Administrator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932).
89. Giles Jacob, The Laws of Appeals and Murder (London: B. Lintot, 1719).
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entitled Essays Relating to the Conduct of Life. 9O In many ways, the
Essays is an unremarkable work. But there are two reasons why it is of
interest. First, the teachings Jacob seeks to instill through his essays very
clearly take their bearings from the ideas one finds in Locke's Essay
Concerning Human Understanding and his various tracts on education.
The second reason Jacob's essays are of some interest is the light they
shed on his possible motives in publishing his other works, especially his
legal compilations and law dictionary.
Locke's purpose in constructing his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, it is worth recalling, was a reasonably modest one. "Our
business here," Locke wrote, "is not to know all things, but those which
concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a ratio-
nal creature put in that state, which man is in, in this world, may, and
ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not
be troubled, that some other things escape our knowledge." 9 ' In his later
works on education, it is precisely this objective that moves Locke. He
seeks through education to make men fit for civil society, that is to say, to
make them capable of being free. In a letter entitled "Instructions for the
Conduct of a Young Gentleman" published in The Remains of John Locke
the author argues that it is by "knowing men and manners" that gentlemen
can come to be guided by prudence, a quality he deems to be rightly
"reckon'd among the cardinal virtues." 92 One can be expected to learn
90. There are in the British Library three editions of this work. The first edition (1717)
was published by Edmund Curll; the second (1726) by T. Cooke; and the third (1730) by J.
Hooke. The case for attributing this work to Jacob is made in Gary L. McDowell, "Giles
Jacob's Conduct of Life," Notes and Queries 242(1997): 190-193, from which this section
draws heavily.
91. Locke, Essay, 1.1.6, p.46.
92. [Anon.], The Remains of John Locke, Esq., (London: E. Curll, 1714), p. 10. It is prob-
ably no coincidence that the first edition of Essays Relating to the Conduct of Life was pub-
lished by the infamous publisher Edmund Curll just three years after he had published (also
anonymously) The Remains of John Locke, Esq. Included in this collection of Locke's tracts,
apparently given to Curil for publication by "R.K", described as "a near relative of Mr.
Locke's," was a letter entitled "Instructions for the Conduct of a Young Gentleman, as to
Religion and Government, etc.". While it bears some similarity to Locke's other writings on
education, especially that recently reprinted as "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and
Study for a Gentleman", it is not the same. The latter correspondence was acknowledged in a
letter of 23 August 1703 from Samuel Bold thanking Locke on behalf of Roger Clavel who
had sought Locke's guidance in such matters. The letter included in Curll's Remains of John
Locke was dated 25 August 1703 and apparently written to "R.K", the Reverend Richard
King, a relation through Peter King. See James Axtell, ed., The Educational Writings of
John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp.397-404; and Locke to
[Richard King], 25 August 1703, letter no. 3328 in E.S. De Beer ed., The Correspondence of
John Locke (8 vols.; Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976-1989), VIII: 56-59.
Although there is no textual evidence to support it, it is at least possible that the anony-
mous editor of CurIl's Remains of John Locke was indeed Jacob who had written anony-
mously at least once before for the infamous publisher. The book was a "treatise" on her-
maphrodites, oddly enough. Tractatus de Hermaphroditis (London, 1718). See Pat Rogers,
Grub Street: Studies in a Subculture (London: Methuen, 1972), pp.2 88-9 .On Curll's reputa-
tion see Ralph Straus, The Unspeakable Curll (London: Chapman & Hall, 1927).
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what one needs to know especially through the study of the history, insti-
tutions and laws of one's own country. The lessons one gleans will be a
safe guide to his conduct.
These sentiments serve as Jacob' s point of departure in the Essays
Relating to the Conduct of Life. For Jacob, the "great art and accomplish-
ment of mankind is that of prudence," 93 and by his little book he sought to
establish a method whereby "particular virtues are illustrated, and vices
detected." 94 The fact was that "the liberality of nature in the person, is fre-
quently attended with a deficiency in the understanding." 95 Thus was it
necessary to "subdue passion," bringing it under the control of "true sense
and right reason," for in human affairs "unruly passion is destructive to
interest, and the greatest author of present and future misery." 96 Jacob set
out to impart moral instruction in order to provide for "a man's decent
guidance through a difficult and capricious world." 97 He was as modest in
his expectations as Locke had been in the Essay. "To be perfectly just," he
cautioned, "is beyond the attainment of human capacity; but to be so in
some degree, is in every one's power, and to be so to the utmost of our
power, is the greatest commendation of man." 98 Jacob's sketch of what
such an education in worldliness for a gentleman should be closely
followed Locke's prescriptions in Some Thoughts Concerning Education.
The concerns were with history, geography, European languages, and
"the laws, government, customs, and manners of other countries, as well
as his own." 99
Another glimpse of Locke's influence on Jacob is in the revision that
occurs for the second edition of the Essays in which Jacob undertakes to
add "some essays on the government of society."'oo In those additions
Jacob moves, as it were, from the Locke of the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding and Thoughts on Education to the Locke of Two Treatises
of Government. And in so doing, he follows Locke's clear teaching that
there is an intimate connection between the conduct of the understanding
and what may be called the moral foundations of legitimate government.
The focus of Jacob's excursion into political theory is tyranny and
the role of law in preventing it. The line between tyranny and order, for
Jacob no less than for Locke, was the idea that political power must be
authorized. "Our king, altho' great," Jacob observes, "is bound by the
laws, as well as his subjects; as we must not on the one hand transgress
93. Jacob, Essays, 2nd ed., p.77.
94. Ibid., Ist ed., preface, p. v.
95. Ibid., p. 41.
96. Ibid., p. 69.
97. Ibid., p. 2.
98. Ibid., 2nd ed., pp. 108-109.
99. Ibid., 1st ed., p. 18. For similarities with Locke, see especially Some Thoughts
Concerning Education, pp. 187, 186, 295, and 324, in Axtell, ed., The Educational Writings
of John Locke.
100. Ibid., 2nd ed., title page.
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them, so he may not on the other incroach [sic] upon them." 10 1 The rea-
son even the king must be deemed bound by the law is that the power he
wields is held only by a grant from the people, a grant originally made to
secure that political liberty that "makes the people of England more flour-
ishing and formidable, than those of any other kingdom."102
For Jacob as for Locke, no king or governor worthy of the name can
act "without authority of the law of the land."10 3 To exceed the bounds of
legality, to overleap the fences of the law, is for a ruler to roam at large in
the trackless fields of his own will, sacrificing the public good to his pri-
vate advantage. As Jacob put it, "a tyrannical prince ... treats his subjects
as a huntsman doth his game, and sets his ministers on the people, like
unto other his hounds upon the prey, who are sure to worry them to death,
or hunt them to dens and comers, whence they dare not stir abroad but for
the sustentation [sic] of life, to give fresh pleasure to their cruel keep-
er." 104 To so behave, in Jacob's estimation, is to descend from legitimate
rule into tyranny which of all the "publick violences and oppressions" one
can imagine is the most destructive to society.105 "[I]f kings and princes
abuse the authority repos'd in them: if instead of cherishing, they oppress
their subjects, they are then no longer kings, but enemies to mankind." 106
The intersection of Jacob's pedagogical and political concerns was at
the point where it was understood that it is "by easy steps and loppings of
liberty" that "tyranny is accomplished." 107 Thus is it of critical impor-
tance to a true "country of liberty" to educate its people in their laws and
institutions so that the first move against them, that first easy step or lop-
ping of their liberty, will be the more easily detected and resisted.108
Jacob's contributions to law have tended to be ignored by virtue of
their being primarily compilations of black-letter law put into alphabetical
order. Yet in his various prefaces to those works, Jacob touches repeated-
ly on the issues raised in Essays Relating to the Conduct of Life-the
importance of educating the people in the laws of their country. As Jacob
said elsewhere, "the subject of our law cannot be made too familiar," for
it is by it that "rights and properties" of the people find protection.109
101. Ibid., 3rded., p. 111.
102. Ibid., 2nd ed., p. 111. "To keep up order, rule and decorum, in the actions of men
one towards another, and preserve them from violating each other, kings and governors were
originally ordained. When they act as they ought, and make justice the pursuit of their
power, they are the bulwarks of right and property, the promoters of virtue, piety, and
humanity; and the fathers of their country: they deserve the highest reverence and obedience;
and everything next to adoration is paid to them."
103. Ibid., pp. 114-15.
104. Ibid., p. 114.
105. Ibid., p. 112.
106. Ibid., p. 111.
107. Ibid., p. 112.
108. Ibid., p. 114.
109. Jacob, Every Man His Own Lawyer; or A Summary of the Laws of England in a New
and Instructive Method (London: J. Hazard, S. Birt, and C. Corbett, 1736), p. iii. This was
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Jacob's understanding of politics began with the view that law was
the only alternative to the barbarity of the state of nature. He knew, as
Locke had taught, that "inclination has no law, and nature no restraint." 10
Outside of civil society and government by consent there is only the"primitive power" of self-defense, that "right of inflicting punishments"
held by every man by virtue of his equality and independence."'
Although there is most assuredly a law of nature which is, in and of itself,
"just and good and binding in all places ... being from God himself,"112
without the "arbitrary laws" 113 of the commonwealth, there is no means
of enforcement. While "all things proceeding from nature are not only
respected in philosophy, but also in [the] law,"1 14 it is only by the force of
the civil law-those "arbitrary laws"-that reason is brought to bear on an
otherwise unruly world. It is the natural desire for self-preservation that
moves men to create the institutions of government necessary for the
maintenance of public order.1 5 The only legitimate exercise of the leg-
islative power is to give effect to those laws of nature that come to be
known to human reason.
The civil law that each nation has "peculiarly established for itself' is
essential to the protection of each man's "life, liberty, and property." 116
This law, this "well ordering of civil society," is a rule that goes beyond
any private judgment of right or wrong.11 7 All laws passed by the legisla-
tive power "are in their nature binding, and lay an obligation," 1' 8 an oblig-
ation of each member of that society to obey. "All lawful authority," Jacob
argues, "is to be submitted to, and resisting it, is resisting the justice of the
commonwealth."1 19 For those necessary obligations to be met, it is essen-
tial that those governed by the laws are able to understand them.
one of Jacob's most popular titles, the seventh edition of which was published in New York
in 1768 and reprinted in Philadelphia in 1769. See Levy, "Origins of the Fifth Amendment
and its Critics," p.855, n.192.
110. Jacob, Love in a Wood: or, The Country Squire, a Farce (London: R. Burleigh,
1714), p. 3 5 .
11. Jacob, Lex Mercatoria: or, the Merchant's Companion (London: B. Motte, J. Clarke
et al., 1729) pp. 2-3.
112. Jacob, A Law Grammar: or, Rudiments of the Law (London: Henry Lintot, 1744),
p.1.
113. Ibid.
114. Jacob, A Treatise of Laws (London: T. Woodward and J. Peele, 1721), p. 10 2 .
115. Jacob, Law Grammar, p.1.
116. Ibid., pp. 3; 5. "All countries require laws for their government, to prevent injuries
and violence, and the invasions of men upon the rights and properties of each other." Jacob,
The Student's Companion: or, The Reason of the Laws of England (London: E. and R. Nutt
and R. Gosling, 1725), p. 113.
117. Ibid., pp. 1;54.
118. Jacob, Lex Mercatoria, p.2.
119. The Student's Companion, p. 128. Since not all men are honest and decent, it is nec-
essary that civil law be built upon an abiding truth of human nature, that "evil men fear to
offend, for fear of pain;" as a result, "'tis necessary that pains should be ordained for
offences." Ibid., p.206.
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While the common law of England was the very "perfection of rea-
son," 120 even there "statutes have been introduced on a deficiency of the
common law."121 In fact, as a general matter, the law was a mess. Jacob
found the common law to be "lying confus'd in our books."122 The
abridgments were characterized by "great perplexity, confusion, and tau-
tology."123 Moreover, in many of the books of the law there was "a great
deal of pedantick and affected stuff' with the result that the average read-
er was more likely to be confounded than instructed.124 When confronting
the tangle of the law, the average reader was "like a traveler in a wood
without a guide, who, when once he is got in, is sure to be lost, and not
find his way out." 125 Jacob's solution was his new method which was a
matter not of "laying the ax to the root" but only of "skilful and judicious
pruning, so as the law may remain an art and science, and justice at the
same time be obtained on easy terms, not oppressive to the people."126
His "good and easy method"1 27 would allow him to clear "the plainest
and easiest road" 128 whereby the people could come to know their law.
A proper public understanding of the law was essential to that great
end of civil society-political liberty. Liberty was a "sacred thing ... the
sum of all our happiness here." Should it be lost, Jacob warned, "we
should miserably find a Hell upon earth." 129 In all forms of government,
liberty is constantly threatened by the encroachment of tyranny-no less
to be expected from rulers of free states than from kings-and there is "no
other fence or security against it but ... [the] laws."03 0 Liberty was not
simply freedom in some limited sense; it was nothing less than the
essence of "the welfare of mankind."13 1 By it men were spurred to action
and gained their property; it was essential that both be secured by the law
of the land. 132 In particular, it was by the law of the land that the king's
prerogative and the people's liberty were bound together, each with
120. Jacob, Treatise of Laws, p.115.
121. Jacob, The Statute Law Common-Plac'd (London: B. Lintot, 1719), p. i.
122. Ibid., p.2.
123. Jacob, The Compleat Chancery- Practise (2 vols.; London: E. & R. Nutt and R.
Gosling, 1730), p. viii.
124. Jacob, City Liberties: or, the Rights and Privileges of Freemen, (London: W. Mears,
1732), p.viii.
125. Jacob, The Student's Companion, p.iv.
126. Giles Jacob to G ---- e C ------ by, Esq., 30 October 1730, in Giles Jacob, The
Mirrour: or, Letters Satyrical, Panegyrical, Serious and Humorous on the Present Times
(London: J. Roberts, 1733), pp. 67-68.
127. Jacob, The Law Military (London: B. Lintot, 1719), p. 1.
128. Jacob, The Compleat Chancery-Practiser, p.vii.
129. Jacob, The Laws of Liberty and Property, (London: E. & R. Nutt and R. Gosling,
1724), pp. i-ii.
130. Ibid., p.iii.
131. Ibid., p.i.
132. Ibid., p.iii.
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"certain limits beyond which they may not venture."1 33 When it came to
the monarchy, "the king can do no wrong, for he has not the power to do
it, he having no power but by law, and there being no law to do
wrong."1 34 Citing William Prynne as his authority, Jacob insisted that
"the laws to which the king assents are more the people's than the king's.
. it is the.., people only that make it a law to bind them. And... the
chief legislative power is in the people and Houses of Parliament, not the
king." 35 Confusion in the law, a disregard for its language and its mean-
ing, would endanger the rights and liberties of the people.
The difficulty of all law, Jacob knew, was that it would inevitably
require interpretation. What was essential, if law was to fulfill its impor-
tant role in civil society, was that the words of the law had to be under-
stood as they were intended, just as in ordinary speech. In every case, "the
sense of the words is to be collected from the cause of the speech, and the
subject of the matter."1 36 When it comes to law, that demand translates
into the necessity that judges called upon to interpret the law must never
forget the essential distinction between "private knowledge and ... judi-
cial knowledge."137 Judges are not permitted to give effect to the law on
the basis of their "own fancy, nor according to [their] own will," but only
on the basis of the meaning of the law as created. 138 Hardly original,
Jacob was just following the great tradition that held that "judges have not
the power to judge according to what they think fit, but that which by the
law they know to be right and consonant to the laws." 139
It was by the rules of grammar that law was to be given its true
meaning. The art of grammar and language is "the portal by which we
enter into the knowledge of all acts and whereby we communicate our-
selves and our studies to others." 140 When it came to the written law,
judges, said Jacob, siding with Coke, "ought not make any interpretation
against the express letter of the statute, for nothing can so well express the
intent of the makers of the act as their direct words themselves." 141 By
limiting themselves to the cause of the law and the subject of the matter,
judges would be able to chain themselves to the law and not wander off
133. Ibid., p.53.
134. Ibid.
135. Jacob, Lex Constitutionis, p.122.
136. Jacob, Treatise of Laws, p.13.
137. Ibid., p.64.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid. This was a common theme to Jacob's works: "A judge is to pronounce sen-
tence according to the law, and what is alledjed [sic] and proved and not according to his
own will and fancy. He hath no power to judge according to what he think fit, but that which
by the law he knows to be right." The Laws of Liberty and Property, p. 57.
140. Jacob, Law Grammar, p.11.
141. Jacob, Treatise of Laws, p. 15. As Coke had reported, "The judges said that they
ought not to make any construction against the express letter of the statute; for nothing can
so express the meaning of the makers of an act as their own direct words, for index animi
sermo." Edrich's Case, 5 Co. Rep. II 8a.
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into the wilderness of their own fancy. It is adherence to the law that con-
stitutes judicial, as opposed to merely private, knowledge. That is to say,"statutes are to be interpreted reasonably, according to the meaning of the
makers." This was true of the old as well as of the new law, for "the
strength of expression in ancient records should be preserved, which is
often preferable to our modern refinements." 142
The triumph of Jacob's effort to secure the liberties of the people by
securing the language and meaning of the law, as well as his effort to
bring the law into a "much narrower compass,"143 was his "master-
piece,"4 A New Law Dictionary. It was an attempt to give an account of
the whole law, and this he did by combining three things into one law
book-"a dictionary, an abridgment, and a vocabulary." 145 It was nothing
less than a "legal encyclopedia," in which he "based upon the definition
of each term a statement of the whole law on the subject."1 46 It was not
enough simply to define the words; he strove to put the meaning in con-
text. Thus did he seek to include the forms and writs of the law in order to"contribute to the right understanding of the law."14 7 So, too, did he take
to include "from the most ancient authors treating the British, Saxon,
Danish, and Norman laws, such information as explain the history and
antiquity of the law, with our manners, customs, and original form of gov-
ernment."148 By his method would the "difficulty and disagreeableness"
of the study of the law be overcome and the law be made manageable.
Jacob's belief that the true meaning of the law was to be found in the
meaning of the words used by the makers of the law was the received tra-
dition of his day, a juridical view with intellectual roots reaching back
hundreds of years; it was also a view that would continue to flower and
flourish until only relatively recently.149 It was a view that was embraced
by those who created the American republic, 150 and it continued to hold
sway among the best minds of the next century.151 Those who turned their
142. Jacob, The Compleat Attorney's Practice (2 vols.; London: Dan Browne, 1737),
pp. i-ii.
143. Jacob, Treatise of Laws, p.iv.
144. Cowley, Abridgments, p. xc.
145. Holdsworth, History of English Law, XII: 176.
146. Cowley, Abridgments, pp. xci; xc.
147. Jacob, A New Law Dictionary, p.ii.
148. Ibid.
149. See those dictionaries that followed in the path Jacob cleared: Timothy
Cunningham, A New and Complete Law Dictionary (2 vols.; London: S. Crowder and J.
Coote, 1764-65); and in the United States, lohn Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the
Constitution and Laws of the United States of America (2 vols.; Philadelphia: T. & J.W.
Johnson, 1839).
150. See, for example, the opinions of Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S 122, 202-203 (1819); and
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).
151. See especially, Joseph Story, "Rules of Interpretation," in Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States (2 vols.; 3rd ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1858),
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attention to the problem of interpretation, especially the interpretation of
the written law and Constitution, embraced the common-sense notion that
the law means what it says and that it says what those who framed it
intended.152 As Francis Lieber put it, "no . . . form of words can have
more than one 'true sense,"' and it is this meaning that is "the very basis
of all interpretation."1 53
CONCLUSION
When Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas turn to dictionaries to try
and determine the original meaning of constitutional provisions and
statutes, they embrace a tradition of interpretation that is anchored in the
liberal foundations of modem constitutionalism. This tradition has both
common law and philosophic roots. One sees on the legal side, for exam-
ple, as early as the fifteenth century a belief that "in our dayes, have those
that were the penners & devisors of statutes bene the grettest lighte for the
exposicion of statutes" where they have given the "declaracion of theire
myndes."154 So, too, did Lord Chancellor Hatton believe that "when the
intent is proved, that it must be followed." 155 The same view was taken
by Sir Edward Coke, who argued that "in Acts of Parliament which are to
be construed according to the intent and meaning of the makers of them,
the original intent and meaning is to be observed."1 56 John Selden would
also argue that "a man's wryting has but one true sense; which is what the
author meant when he writ it."157 The portal to that original meaning is
the words chosen by which that meaning or intention of the lawmaker was
expressed.
On the philosophic side of the tradition, one sees as early as
Hobbes's writings an understanding that good laws are those that are
"Needfull, for the Good of the People and withall Perspicuous" by which
I1: 282-325; and Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics: or, Principles of
Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedents and
Authorities, the third edition of which is helpfully reprinted in Cardozo Law Review
16(1995): 1879-2105.
152. See, for example, Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the
Interpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law (New York: Voorhies,
1857); Sir Peter Benson Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes (London: William
Maxwell & Sons, 1875); Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Written Laws and their
Interpretation (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1882); Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on
the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing
Company, 1896);
153. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, in Cardozo Law Review, p.1943.
154. Samuel Thome, ed., A Discourse on the Exposicion & Understandinge of Statutes
(San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 1942), pp. 151-52.
155. Christopher Hatton, A Treatise Concerning Statutes and Acts of Parliament and
Exposition Thereof(London, 1677), pp. 14-15.
156. Magdalen College Case, 11 Co. Rep at 73b.
157. Sir Frederick Pollock, ed., The Table Talk of John Selden (London: Quaritch, 1927),
pp.12-13.
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he meant that a good law was one that revealed "the Causes, and Motives,
for which it was made ... the meaning of the legislature." In his view,
there was "only one sense of the law" and that one sense "is not the
Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentique
Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator) in which
the nature of the law consisteth." Should the law "be made to beare a
sense contrary to that of the sovereign," the interpreter would, in effect,
become the legislator.158
More abstractly, Locke understood words to be sounds that "stand as
marks for the ideas within [a man's] own mind, whereby they might be
made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed
from one to another." Properly used, words will elicit in the mind of the
hearer the same idea that is in the mind of the speaker: "When a man
speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech
is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer."
Thus it is essential that "the same sign stands for the same idea." Put most
bluntly, "Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for
nothing, but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them." 159
Others followed this same path toward meaning. Thomas
Rutherforth, for example, offered a theory of interpretation in his
Institutes of Natural Law that carried great weight with those involved in
the creation of the American constitutional order. 160 "The end, which
interpretation aims at," Rutherforth wrote, "is to find out what was the
intention of the writer; to clear up the meaning of his words, if they are
obscure; to ascertain the sense of them, if they are ambiguous; to deter-
mine what his design was, where his words express it imperfectly." 1 61
What must be sought by those interpreting laws is "the intention of the
legislator [but] not merely as this intention as an act of mind; but as it is
declared or expressed by some outward sign or mark, which makes it
known to us." 162 What that means, more deeply, is that the "meaning of
the law is the design of the lawmaker in respect to what he commands or
forbids. The reason of a law is his design in respect of the end or purpose,
for which he commands or forbids it."163 The point of interpretation is to
learn "the true sense" of the law, and that means understanding it as it was
understood by those who made it. An understanding of "contemporary
practice, that is, . . .the practice which the law produced in the first
instance" will allow the interpreter to see the sense in which it was
158. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 162-63; 268; 264; 211-12.
159. Locke, Essay, 111.1.2, p.402; 111.11.2, p.4 05; III.VI.45, p.467; 111.11.2, p. 4 0 5 .
160. For a more complete account of Rutherforth, see Gary L. McDowell, "The Limits of
Natural Law: Thomas Rutherforth and the American Legal Tradition," The American
Journal of Jurisprudence 37(1992): 57-81.
161. Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law (Baltimore: W. & J. Neal, 1832),
p.405.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid., p.4 15.
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originally understood, and "a view of this practice will be a means of
removing any doubts about the sense of it, which are owing only to our
remoteness from its original establishment." 164
Rutherforth was not alone. Samuel Pufendorf was of a similar mind,
noting that the "true and design of interpretation is, to gather the intent of
the man from the most probable signs ... [either] words or other conjec-
tures which may be considered separately or both together." When it
comes to words, as a general rule, "they are to be understood in their
proper and most known signification; not so much according to grammar,
as to the general use of them." That which helps most "in the discovery of
the true meaning of the law, is the reason of it, the cause which moved the
legislator to enact it."165 When it comes to the language of the law, "the
meaning of the law is such, and no other." 166
Another near contemporary of Pufendorf and Rutherforth, Emerich
de Vattel, insisted along similar lines that there needed to be "certain
fixed rules" designed to help determine the meaning of laws and
treaties. 167 Indeed, the central rule, "the sole object of lawful interpreta-
tion" is the discovery of the original meaning of the law in question. 168
The reason for this rule is simple enough: "Words are only designed to
express thoughts; thus the true signification of an expression in common
use is the idea which custom has affixed to that expression." 69 There is
an obligation to define words in such a way as "the party whose words we
interpret probably had in contemplation." 170 When that intention is
known, "it is not allowable to wrest [the] words to a contrary mean-
ing."' 7 1 Again, like Rutherforth, not even the changes in language that
time inevitably brings is sufficient to change the meaning of the law. The
terms of any legal document must be understood as they were understood"at the time when it was written." 172 Without that original meaning,
words are simply "nothing."1 73
These strands of the liberal interpretive tradition, common law and
philosophic, were taken up by those who fashioned the Constitution and
thus informed their understanding of how written laws and constitutions
were to be interpreted. When it came to construction of the laws,
Alexander Hamilton argued the "rules of legal interpretation are the rules
164. Ibid. p.419.
165. Samuel Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, trans. B. Kennet, (London: J.J.
Bonwicke, et al., 1749), IV.XII.II, pp.535; IV.XII.II1, p.535; IV.XII.X, p.S41.
166. Ibid., IVIXlIi, p.66.
167. Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ed. J. Chitty (London: S. Sweet, 1834),
p.246.
168. Ibid., p.247.
169. Ibid., p.249.
170. Ibid., 250.
171. Ibid, p.249.
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of common sense." 174 The thing to be sought was simply the "intention of
the people" as expressed in the Constitution. 175 This was the result, as
Chief Justice Marshall put it, of the fact that the most basic premise of
popular government is that "the people have an original right to establish
for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness." Because the exercise of this original
right cannot be frequently repeated, those principles once established are
"deemed fundamental" and are "designed to be permanent." This was
why he considered the written constitution as nothing less than "the great-
est improvement on political institutions." 176
Marshall had no doubt that anything the people intended to include
in their Constitution they had "declared ... in plain and intelligible lan-
guage."1 77 Thus did he hold to the maxims of interpretation that had fil-
tered down through the ages: "The object of language is to communicate
the intention of him who speaks, and the great duty of a judge who con-
strues an instrument, is to find the intention of its makers." To interpret
instruments "fairly" was simply "to give effect to their intention." On this
he was not ambiguous: "intention is the most sacred rule of interpreta-
tion." 178 When it came to the language used to express that intention,
Marshall argued that if a word "was so understood ...when the
Constitution was framed . . .[t]he convention must have used it in that
sense." 179
This common sense notion of interpretation as the search for the
original meaning of the Constitution was perhaps best explained and
defended by Justice Joseph Story in his magisterial Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States. 180 Strongly influenced by both
Hamilton and Marshall, as well as Rutherforth and Vattel, Story set out in
his treatise an entire chapter on "The Rules of Interpretation" in which he
sought to make the case that constitutions are "instruments of a practical
nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to
174. [Alexander Hamilton] The Federalist, ed. Jacob G. Cooke, (Middletown Ct.:
Wesleyan University Press, 1961) no. 83, p. 559.
175. Ibid., no. 78, p. 525.
176. Marbury v. Madison, at 176-77; 178.
177. Barron v. Baltimore, at 250.
178. Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense ofMcCulloch v. Maryland (Stanford
Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 167-169.
179. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 190 (1824). He was of a similar mind when it came to
understanding those common law terms that had been used by the Founders in drafting the
Constitution. When it came to understanding what was meant by the word "treason" in the
Burr case, he was blunt: "It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the
framers of our constitution in the same sense which had been affixed to it by those from
whom we borrowed it. So far as the meaning of any terms, particularly terms of art, is com-
pletely ascertained, those by whom they are employed must be considered as employing
them in that ascertained meaning." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas (no.14,693) 55, 159
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common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common under-
standings."181 They did not demand the "exercise of philosophical acute-
ness" to grasp their meaning. Story was straightforward: "The people
make them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read
them, with the help of common sense; and they cannot be presumed to
admit in them any recondite meaning or extraordinary gloss."1 82
Moreover, they are immune to what one of the founding generation called
"the rude storms of time." 183 In Story's view "the policy of one age may
ill suit the wishes or policy of another. The Constitution is not to be sub-
ject to such fluctuations. It is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent con-
struction. It should be ... not dependent upon the passion of parties of
particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.", 84
The first effort to fashion a science of interpretation was Francis
Lieber's influential Legal and Political Hermeneutics.185 In Lieber's
view, "interpretation, in its widest meaning, is the discovery and represen-
tation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas." 186 Those
signs most often used by men to convey their ideas are, of course,
words." 187 Since all human communication is by the medium of words,
interpretation "has [never] been dispensed with; never can it be dispensed
with." 188 To Lieber, as to Story, Marshall, Hamilton and all those who
preceded them, it was a matter of "common sense": "Interpretation is the
art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is, the sense
which their author intended to convey, and enabling others to derive from
them the same ideas which the author intended to convey."189 Any other
effort at interpretation will lead to a supplanting of that original intention
or meaning with nothing more than the "subjective view of the judge," his
private opinions of right and wrong. 190 And that would be "the worst of
all justice."191 For law is to be an "immutable rule-a rule above the
judge, not one in his breast." 192
Reliance on dictionaries or law dictionaries published at the time of
the writing and ratifying of the Constitution is one way to try and estab-
lish its meaning that also shies away from any reliance on the subjective
181. Ibid., 1: 322.
182. Ibid.
183. [Theophilus Parsons], The Essex Result (Newburyport, 1778), in Charles S.
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intentions of those who were involved in its creation. Far from being at
odds with the tradition of interpretation to which the Constitution gave
rise, it is part of an antecedent tradition, both legal and philosophic, that
gave rise to the Constitution itself. The belief that the language of the law
means something, and that its meaning is intended to bind down those
who would interpret it, it nothing less than the essence of American con-
stitutionalism.
